In the Univalent Foundations of mathematics spatial notions like "point" and "path" are primitive, rather than derived, and all of mathematics is encoded in terms of them. A Homotopy Type Theory is any formal system which realizes this idea. In this paper I will focus on the question of whether a Homotopy Type Theory (as a formalism for the Univalent Foundations) can be justified intuitively as a theory of shapes in the same way that ZFC (as a formalism for set-theoretic foundations) can be justified intuitively as a theory of collections. I first clarify what such an "intuitive justification" should be by distinguishing between formal and pre-formal "meaning explanations" in the vein of Martin-Löf. I then go on to develop a pre-formal meaning explanation for HoTT in terms of primitive spatial notions like "shape", "path" etc.
Introduction
The Univalent Foundations (UF) of mathematics take the point of view that the basic objects of mathematics are shapes rather than sets. UF is usually formalized in terms of formal theories called Homotopy Type Theories (HoTT(s)). 1 Set theory, usually formalized as ZFC, is the currently accepted foundation of mathematics by the community of mathematicians. 2 A pressing issue is therefore to articulate the relationship between set-theoretic foundations and the Univalent Foundations, as well as more specifically that of ZFC and HoTT as their respective formalizations. 3 In this paper we will focus on the following question: can we understand the basic objects of UF ("shapes") in a way that is autonomous from set theory? One way to make the question of autonomy precise is as follows: can the rules of some HoTT be understood in terms of pre-formal notions that are independent from naive set theory? 4 Doing so is what I will understand by the phrase "a meaning explanation for HoTT". This is the task we undertake in this paper, using a meaning explanation that is spatial in character.
On meaning explanations
The term meaning explanation is used in various often conflicting contexts and therefore requires clarification. A meaning explanation as I will understand the term applies to a formal system F. A formal system F is comprised of a formally specified syntax S and rules R of the form s 1 s 2 . . .
where s 1 , . . . , s n , t are elements of S. For example, the s i could be well-formed formulas if S is taken to be a first-order signature or they could be expressions of the form Γ J if S is the syntax of a dependent type theory. A meaning explanation now does two things. Firstly, it assigns to each s ∈ S a meaning s M , i.e. some way of understanding s that goes beyond the symbols which comprise it. For example, for S a first-order signature and s the formula φ ∧ ψ then the classical meaning for s would be "φ and ψ are true". Or if S is a dependently typed syntax and s the expression x : A B Type then a meaning for s would be that "in context x : A, B is a well-formed type".
Secondly, a meaning explanation justifies the rules R through their assigned meaning. This means that a rule R as above is justified if from the truth of s M 1 , . . . , s M n the truth of t M follows. For example, let S be a first-order signature, let R be the ∧-introduction rule 2 For an account of ZFC's emergence as a standard of rigour see Burgess (2014) .
3 Some facts are already known about the technical relationship between ZFC and HoTT. For example, the simplicial model of univalence (Kapulkin et al. 2014) gives an interpretation of HoTT into ZFC supplemented with two inaccessible cardinals and Cubical Type Theory (CTT) (Bezem et al. 2014; Cohen et al. 2015 ) is expected to be interpretable into a constructive theory like CZF (Aczel 1978) . In the other direction, the 0-types ("h-sets") in a univalent universe are known to model (variants of) Lawvere's ETCS (cf. Lawvere 2005) known to be equiconsistent with the system BZC. 4 There are other, less specific, ways of understanding autonomy. The autonomy that I speak of is perhaps closest to the "justificatory autonomy" of foundations as made precise by Linnebo and Pettigrew (2011) .
and let the meaning of ∧ be the usual conjunction. Then the rule R is justified by arguing that if φ is true and ψ is true then φ ∧ ψ is true. The same reasoning also applies to axioms, whose justification for the purposes of this paper should be taken to be a special case of the situation just described. 5 There are thus two key components of a meaning explanation for a formal system F = (S, R): the meaning of the syntax S and justification of the rules R.
We must now distinguish between formal and pre-formal meaning explanations. A formal meaning explanation assigns to each s in S a meaning in terms of notions that are understood in terms of some other formal system. For example, a formal meaning for φ ∧ ψ would be given by interpreting φ, ψ as sets and ∧ as their cartesian product and their respective truth as their inhabitation. What makes this a formal meaning is that in this case a set is understood as a formal construct in its own right, described by another formal system F = (S , R ) (e.g. by ZFC) and so what we are really doing is interpreting F into F . Similarly, interpreting the judgments of a dependent type theory as statements about a certain contextual category (cf. Cartmell 1986; is to supply them with a formal meaning.
On the other hand, a pre-formal meaning explanation assigns to each s in S a meaning in terms of notions intuitively comprehensible even without a mathematical theory. For example, a pre-formal meaning for φ ∧ ψ would be given by interpreting ∧ as the natural language "and". What makes this a pre-formal meaning is the fact that natural language is not to be regarded as another formal system F but is rather a setting in which words have some intuitive content, comprehensible to the human mind. Another way of explaining this difference is in terms of "pre-mathematical" versus "meta-mathematical" justifications for a formal system. A pre-mathematical justification is one that does not rely on an interpretation of the given formal system within some equally formal metatheory, whereas a meta-mathematical justification is one that interprets the given formal system in some other formal system. The reader may take my use of the terms "intuitive" and "pre-formal" as synonymous to "premathematical".
Whatever the relative merits of formal or pre-formal meaning explanations may be, it is very important for the purposes of this paper to keep them apart. For what I want to do in this paper is to provide a pre-formal meaning explanation for Homotopy Type Theory. I am in agreement with Martin-Löf that providing such a pre-formal meaning explanation is 5 For example, the formal system ZFC can be defined with S the set of well-formed first-order formulas over the signature with ∈ the only non-logical symbol and with R the usual rules for classical first-order logic together with rules of the form φ A for every axiom φ of ZFC. A meaning explanation for ZFC would then need to give a meaning to the symbol ∈ such that the axiom-rules such as A are justified, which in this case means simply that φ can be argued to be true (from no premises). For example, for φ the axiom for the empty set we would have to argue that it is true under the particular meaning of ∈ that there is an entity with no elements.
[ Thus what I am after here is resolutely not the kind of formal interpretation of HoTT in set theory sketched in Kapulkin et al. (2014) , and Bezem et al. (2014) . My efforts here more closely compare to Computational Higher Type Theory (CHTT) (Angiuli et al. 2016; Hou 2017 ) which seeks (among other things) to provide computational meaning explanations to HoTT-style systems in terms of realizability semantics -although the CHTT developers also concede that their "meaning explanation" is a mathematical one. What I am after, rather, is a genuinely "meaning-theoretical" explanation of HoTT. Therefore, the ultimate goal of this paper is to attempt to do for HoTT using notions such as "shapes", "points" etc. what Boolos (1971) did for ZFC using notions such as "stages", "properties" etc. Finally, there is one more distinction that may be helpful to make. A pre-formal meaning explanation may be either serve as a heuristic or it may serve a justificatory role. Although the line is not easy to draw between the two, I would like to think of the distinction in terms of understanding versus accepting. A heuristic is a guiding intuition, which allows us to understand an unfamiliar new thing (e.g. a formal system, in our case), even if we cannot yet justify it (e.g. accept that its rules are true). A justificatory meaning explanation on the other hand, as the name suggests, is a heuristic which compels acceptance; namely, a convincing heuristic. For example, an informal description of the simplicial model of univalence (which does not go into the details of the proofs) is a heuristic; but Boolos' (1971) explanation of the axioms of ZFC in terms of "stages" and "collections" is (an attempt at) a justificatory heuristic for the axioms of ZFC. In short: a heuristic achieves understanding, whereas a justificatory meaning explanation achieves acceptance.
Since a heuristic can be useful even if it does not become justificatory, what follows below can be understood in a stepwise manner. First, in Sect. 2, I will describe a heuristic for HoTT, which may be summarized as the "shape heuristic". 6 I believe that this heuristic is indeed a justificatory one (i.e. provides a pre-formal meaning explanation in the strong sense), but what is said in Sect. 2 does not require the reader to accept this. Second, in Sect. 3, I will indicate why I think the shape heuristic does indeed provide a justificatory pre-formal meaning explanation for HoTT.
which has guided the development of MLTT. This meaning explanation understood the basic syntactic elements of MLTT ("judgments") in terms of notions of computation and evaluation to canonical values, mixed in with a BHK-style interpretation of the logical connectives and quantifiers. 8 For example, the meaning of the judgment A Type was that A is specification for a particular task or program and the meaning of a : A was that a is a program that satisfies the specification of A or, equivalently, which can carry out the task specified by A. 9 So why can we not build on Martin-Löf's meaning explanation in order to justify HoTT? Because, quite simply, the meaning explanation of Martin-Löf validates a rule for identity types ("Uniqueness of Identity Proofs" or UIP) with which any HoTT is inconsistent. In particular, UIP is inconsistent with the axiom of univalence which is the fundamental new addition to HoTT that differentiates it from MLTT. 10 Thus, the grounds upon which the additional rules of HoTT are to be justified cannot be an extension of the grounds upon which the original rules were justified. Therefore, we have to provide a completely new pre-formal meaning explanation for the rules of HoTT, one that neither piggybacks on set theory, nor extends Martin-Löf's programming-inspired meaning explanation. 11 To do so, we will now describe a realm of shapes and use this pre-formal description of shapes to understand the syntax and the rules of a specific HoTT. The syntax and rules for our HoTT have been given in full in the appendix. It consists of: 1. The usual syntax of MLTT and associated structural rules. 2. Rules for the following constructors: Total ("Σ"), Map ("Π "), Path ("Id"), 0, 1 and N. 3. A sequence of cumulative universes U i closed under all the above constructors for i ∈ ω. 12 4. Propositional resizing and univalence for each universe.
From now on I will use the term "HoTT" to refer to this specific formal system. 13
The meaning of the syntax
We start with a space of shapes. Everything in space is a shape. All shapes exist in space. Shapes have points.
We access shapes and their points through observations. There are four fundamental observations we can make. We can observe a shape
A Shape
We can observe a point on a shape a : A To observe a shape is to observe a certain presentation of a shape (to observe it from a certain angle, as it were). Thus, the same shape can be presented to us in different ways and two such presentations are symmetric if they are presentations of the same shape
Similarly, the same point can be presented to us in different ways (from different viewpoints, as it were) a ≡ b : A We can write O for any of the four types of observation.
Observations can be made from viewpoints. A viewpoint consists of the points of a shape (or, equivalently, of a single generic point on the shape) and given any viewpoint Γ and shape A we write Γ , x : A view for the viewpoint which extends Γ by the points of A.
Footnote 12 continued use of set-theoretic language here is purely conventional, occurs at the meta-theory level, and carries no commitments. 13 UniMath ) is the closest formal realization of my HoTT, at least insofar as one ignores the fact that it is built on top of Coq, which is itself based on the much stronger Calculus of Inductive Constructions. Alternatively, HoTT can be taken as the system described in the Appendix of Kapulkin et al. (2014) if we replace the rules of W -types with the rules for N (which follow anyway as a special case of W -types). Clearly this is not the only system that adequately formalizes UF, nor is it clearly the most suitable one to receive a meaning explanation. Each such observation can be "relativized" to a viewpoint. To observe a shape from a viewpoint is then to observe only a "portion" of the "whole" shape, namely the portion that is visible from that specific viewpoint. What we observe of a shape, therefore, can depend on a viewpoint. 15 That said, the term viewpoint should not be regarded only in the limited sense of a single point, but rather as an accumulation of successive points on shapes, the last of which is where we are currently observing from, but all the previous points also inform what we can see from there. Think of a metropolis; on that metropolis, you walk into a skyscraper; in the skyscraper you enter an elevator; that elevator takes you to the top floor; on the top floor you come out onto a terrace; from the edge of the terrace you observe an island across the sea. Clearly, the view you have of the island depends on where you are standing on the terrace-but it also depends on the fact that you are in this particular city, that you walked into this particular skyscraper, picked that elevator, etc. A "viewpoint" in our sense should thus be understood as taking into account all this information (and not just as consisting of the "rightmost" point in a context). Overall, we have four primitive notions that give meaning to the syntax of MLTT, on which the whole proposed meaning explanation for HoTT rests: viewpoint (replacing "context"), point (replacing "term") shape (replacing "type") and symmetric (replacing "judgmentally equal")
The visualization of the rules
Given the interpretation of judgments as observations and contexts as viewpoints, we will now try to understand the rules of HoTT. Before we begin, I want to introduce a neologism, which explains the title of this subsection: instead of saying that we will understand the rules of HoTT, I will instead say we will visualize these rules.
The reason for using "visualize" instead of "understand" is that the rules of the specific HoTT that I will visualize/understand are not to be thought of merely as rules asserting the mere preservation of some property from what is above the line to what is below the line (e.g. truth-preservation). Rather, they are to be thought of as describing certain operations (or constructions) in space. The rules of HoTT are not assertions about the preservation of properties; they are descriptions of the existence of structure. Thus, a rule of HoTT is not to be justified merely as a statement about what observations can be made (given certain observation already made), but rather it will be visualized by how these observations are made (given how certain observations have already been made). In slogan form: properties can be justified, but structure must be visualized. 16 In what we say below, therefore, one should not ask "Is the rule justified?" but rather "Can I visualize it?" I believe this distinction is fundamental, and justifies the potentially disconcerting (and annoying) usage of sentences like "Fact P visualizes rule R" as replacements (indeed, generalizations) for the sentence "Fact P justifies rule R".
Structural rules
There is a basic or "neutral" viewpoint, from which observations can begin, which is how we visualize the following rule:
Suppose we are standing on a viewpoint Γ and from it we can observe a shape. As it were, we expand any viewpoint to include any shape we can observe from it, and this is how we visualize the following rule:
Intuitively it tells us where exactly we can "move around" on the new shape we have added to our viewpoint in order to make new observations. Now, given any viewpoint that contains a shape A we can always observe a point on A. Clearly, if we are "standing" on a viewpoint we can observe any of its points. And this is how we visualize the following rule:
The structural rules for symmetry observations (Sym-shape-sym, Sym-shape-tran etc.) are visualized by the fact that symmetry is clearly intuitively an equivalence relation, and that it "respects typing" because if a shape can be placed one on top of the other, then any point on either shape can also be seen as a point on the other shape. For example, take the following rule
What we have above the line is the assurance that we can observe a point a on a shape A and that shape A is symmetric to shape B. Being symmetric means that these two shapes are the same shape-but we have observed them from a different perspective. Think of A as a square and B as the square produced by flipping A along a line of symmetry. Then, clearly, the point a on A can also be observed to lie on B, thus giving us the observation below the line, and thus allowing us to visualize Sym-tran. The visualization of the rest of the structural rules concerning symmetry proceed very similarly.
Rules for shape constructors
The rules for each shape constructor must now be visualized as describing how to construct new shapes obtained from previously-obtained shapes. For example, a formation rule answers the question "When can we observe X ?" and an introduction rule answers the question "When can we observe a point of X ?" In what follows I will generally forgo mention of the (always assumed) implicit viewpoint Γ . The reader may assume that all the visualizations below take place relative to a given viewpoint and this does not alter their essential content.
Map-shapes as shapes of maps
If a shape can be observed from another shape there is a shape of maps of the latter shape into the former. A map is an assignment of the points of a shape to the points of the shape it maps to. So if we can observe a shape A and from any x on A we can observe a shape B(x) then we introduce the symbol
to represent the shape of maps from A to the shapes B(x) visible from each point x of A. This is the map shape or shape of sections, which allows us to visualize the following rule
Whenever A and B can be observed from the same viewpoint (i.e. whenever there is no "dependency") we will also simply write
for the map shape from A to B. Now assume that for any point x on A we can observe a point b(x) on the portion B(x). But a map between shapes is nothing other than a rule that takes a point of one shape to a point of the other shape. Therefore we have a map from each point x on A to B such that the point x gets sent to the portion B(x). Such a map is exactly a point of Map x:A B(x) as just described, which allows us to visualize the following rule
Map-Intro in which the notation λ(x : A).b(x) is understood as the map which takes a point x on A to the point b(x) on B(x) we observe from it. Now assume we can observe a point f on the map shape Map x:A B(x), i.e. a map from A to portions of B and also a point a on A. But since f is a map we know there we can observe the point f (a) on the shape B(a) visible from a, which visualizes the following rule:
Now assume that we can observe a point b(x) from any point x of A and that we are given a point a of A. From the first assumption we can, on the one hand, produce a point (i.e. a map) on Map x:A B(x) and then this point will give us a corresponding point on B(a). On the observation Γ a : A we know that from a some point will be observable on B(a). These two points are clearly the same point, which visualizes the following rule:
This completes the visualization for the rules of map shapes.
Total-shapes as total shapes
If a shape can be observed from the viewpoint of another shape, there is a shape whose points are pairs consisting of a point of the first shape and a point on the shape observable from that point. This is the total shape which visualizes the following rule:
The points of the total shape are pairs of points, where the second component of the pair is a point on the shape observable from the first. So if we can observe a point a on a shape A and a point b on the shape B[a/x] observable from a then we can observe a point on the total shape. This visualizes the following rule:
Every point of the total shape must be visualized exactly as a pair of points. Therefore, for each such point on the total shape that we have observed, we can project it onto the points on the shapes that make up the total shape. In other words, we can always observe the "shadow" of a pair on the shapes from which that pair was formed. This is how we visualize the following rules:
These "projected" (or "shadow") points are visualized as exactly the points the pair is made of and conversely any point of the total shape is symmetric to the pair of points that one obtains by "projecting". This is how we visualize the following rules:
This completes the visualization for the rules of total shapes.
1-Shapes as singleton shapes
A point is a shape, which means that we can visualize a shape with a single point. This is the singleton shape, which visualizes the following rules:
Assume we have observed a point a on a shape A. Then we can observe a map from 1 to A that takes the unique point of 1 to a (since a map is an assignment of points to points and there is only one point in 1 that we can assign to a). This visualizes the following two rules:
Path-shapes as shapes of paths between points
Points on a shape can be connected by a path. The paths between two points also form a shape (since everything is a shape) and the points of that shape are the paths. This is the path shape, which visualizes the following rule:
We can always observe the trivial or reflexivity path from a point to itself, which is the path that remains constant, i.e. the "non-path" from a point to itself, and which visualizes the following rule:
Now, suppose that we can observe two points a, a on a shape A and a path p : Path A (a, a ) between them, and suppose that from the viewpoint of A we observe shapes B. Then the path p "lifts" to a map t p between the shape B(a) we observe from a and the shape B(a ) we observe from b. We can visualize this as follows:
The spatial intuition here is that "above" we map via t p the red shape B(a) on the left to the green shape B(a ) on the right by simply tracing the points of the former onto the points of the latter, along p "below". This is exactly how we visualize the following rule:
Path-transport
We call the map t p the transport (map) along p. Clearly the transport along the trivial path leaves any point exactly where it was, since we trace each observed point to itself. This is how we visualize the following rule:
Visualizing the paths between points on shapes is fundamental. How these paths behave is exactly what determines the notion of a shape that we are visualizing. The key spatial intuition here is that we can make no observation from a point on a shape that cannot also be "carried" along a path. Thus, any point on a shape can be "deformed" to any other point to which it is connected by a path. Every observation we make on a shape is "path-invariant"-and as such, we must visualize shapes as [...] some sort of vague space, which can be very severely deformed, mapped one to another, and all the while the specific space is not important, but only the space up to deformation. If we really want to return to discrete objects, we see continuous components, the pieces whose form or even dimension does not matter. Earlier, all these spaces were thought of as Cantor sets with topology, their maps were Cantor maps, some of them were homotopies that should have been factored out, and so on. [...] [P]oints become continuous components, or attractors [...] almost from the start. (Gelfand 2009 (Gelfand , p. 1274 Keeping this visualization in mind, we can now make meaningful definitions of a contractible shape and of the notion of an equivalence of shapes.
Contractible shapes
A shape is contractible if it can be continuously deformed down to a point. In other words, a shape is contractible if up to deformation it is indistinguishable from a point. More precisely, we can define a shape to be contractible if there is a point on it such that every other point can be continuously connected to it by a path. In other words: a shape is contractible if it has only one point up to a path. Thus, in order to observe that a shape is contractible we need to observe that there is such a point (a "center of contraction") and a map that takes any other point to a path connecting them. To observe such a pair is exactly to observe a point on a certain total shape, which is how we visualize the following definition
Thus, to observe that a shape A is contractible is formalized in HoTT as the observation of a point on iscontractible(A).
Equivalence of shapes
Two shapes are equivalent if they can be continuously deformed into one another by a map without tearing or gluing. 17 Thus, a deformed torus is equivalent to a smooth torus and not equivalent to a torus with many holes and a disc is equivalent to a point but not to the shape consisting of two points * * * Now, take a map f : A → B between shapes. For any point b on B we can visualize the shape of all those points in A such that f maps to some point b to which b is connected by a path. We call this shape the fiber of f over b and we can visualize it as the "cylinder shape" traced out in magenta below:
A point of this fiber can be visualized as the pair of blue lines above, i.e. as line (not a path!) connecting x to f (x) together with a path from f (x) to b. Following this visual intuition, the fiber (of map f over a point b) can thus be formalized as the following total shape
Now, to say that a fiber is contractible is to say that all these pairs of points can be squashed down to a single point. Since the points of the fiber can be thought of as a line attached to a path, then "squashing down to a point" for the fiber would correspond to being able to contract the cylinder down to a single line, connecting x to b:
And if this process can be carried out for every point of B, viz. if every fiber of f is contractible, then f would intuitively define a deformation of A into B, since it will map, up to a path, every point of A to precisely one point of B. On the other hand, if the fiber over a point looked like this then we would not, intuitively, be able to squash the "double cylinder" down to a line, but only down to a "V" shape. Spatially, this captures the fact that f in this case fails to be "injective" (since it "identifies" two distinct points of A) and therefore does not establish a one-to-one correspondence between points of A and points of B.
Visually, therefore, an equivalence should be understood as a map that connects two shapes through a series of "cylinders" whose endpoints completely cover them and such that each such "cylinder" can be contracted down to a line. Thus, to observe that a map A → B is an equivalence is to observe a map that takes every point of B to a center of contraction for its fiber. This allows us to visualize the following formal definition of equivalence
Identity is an equivalence
The identity map id A on a shape A can be visualized as the map from A to A which takes a point to itself. This identity is an equivalence, since a shape clearly deforms to itself if we just do nothing to it. This is spatially obvious and it visualizes the following rule:
Since the statement that the identity map on a shape A is an equivalence is symmetric to the statement that the fiber of every point on that shape is contractible, then we can visualize the center of contraction for these fibers to be exactly the pair given by the point and the trivial path on that point:
This completes the visualization of the rules for the path shapes. The rules that we have chosen to visualize are not how the rules for "identity types" of MLTT are usually presented, but our rules are in fact equivalent (in the sense of being inter-admissible) to the usual rules for the identity type of MLTT. 18 We chose to present them this way because they seem to us much easier to visualize spatially -but to do so required us to detour through the notion of contractibility and equivalence. 19
0-shape as the empty shape
There is a shape with no points.
Γ 0 Shape 0-Form
This is the empty shape, which we can visualize as the absence of shape in space. Now assume that we could observe a point e on the empty shape. Such a point e of the empty shape would be a point "in the void" between shapes. And so if from that point you can observe any shape A then there is nothing separating you from "moving closer" to A in order to observe a point on it (since you can freely move in the void, having been granted, per impossibile, a point on the void). The intuition-at the risk of sounding fanciful-is that if you are given a point of the empty shape (a point in the "void") then you are given a foothold to make any observation whatsoever. Therefore, given a place to "stand on" in the void you can move around the void freely, making every observation possible: you can move, as it were, without friction. But, of course, you should never be able to stand on a point in the void, since the void is the absence of points. In other words, the spatial visualization of ex falso quodlibet is that having a point in the void allows you to observe anything whatsoever:
Γ efq e : A 0-Elim N-shape as the infinite discrete shape N is to be understood as the infinite discrete shape, i.e. a shape where there are infinitely many points not connected by paths. Spatially, this means that we can always observe a point on N and if we can observe a point n on N then we can observe another point s(n). In other words, we visualize the shape N as being "indefinitely extendible". 20 I believe the spatial intuition for such a shape, and the fact that it is reasonable to assume it exists, is clear, and it helps us visualize the following two rules:
Now let C be a shape we can observe from the viewpoint of N. Suppose we can observe a point on the portion of C over 0 -which ensures that the total shape of all portions of C above N is non-empty. Now assume that from the viewpoint consisting of any point z of the total shape Total x : N C(x) we can observe a point c s on the portion of C over the successor of the first projection of z. That is, for any pair of points x on N and y on C over x we can observe a point c s on C over s(x)-namely, we can always "skip ahead" on N, look "up", and still observe a point on (the portion of) C (above from where we are standing). Then, clearly, given any point on N we can observe a point on C above n in such a way that if n is 0 that point is c 0 and if n is s(m) then that point is c s . And this is exactly how we can visualize the following rules:
shapes as shapes of shapes
We can imagine that space itself is a shape (living in some "higher" space). Then we have the shape of all shapes: a universe shape. In fact, we can visualize a hierarchy of such universes
Footnote 20 continued Friedman has suggested a way of interpreting Z 2 (roughly, second-order arithmetic) into a first-order theory built out of purely geometric notions. Such efforts, especially the ones of Friedman that were motivated by similar considerations as the ones that motivate me here, could certainly help in fleshing out a purely geometric understanding of PA/HA, one that could then be used to give a more purely spatial justification to rules such as N-Intro-2.
More precisely, each U i is a "shape whose points are shapes". Every point on a universe is a shape and if we can observe it as a point then we can observe it as a shape, which visualizes the following rule:
The visual that I find helpful here is that of a fractal-like accumulation of points-and the closer one "zooms into" one of these points, the more one sees them as shapes in their own right. Indeed, this is exactly how we to visualize Pts in the rule U-Points: as the operation of "blowing up" points of a universe into actual shapes. This visual also justifies all the "closure" rules (U i -Map-1, U i -Map-2, U i -Total-1 etc.) given in the Appendix, which we will not write out in full here. Each such rule states that a point on a universe constructed by the shape-constructors we have so far seen is symmetric, and therefore identical to, its "underlying" shape. This is intuitive since the meaning of U i is fixed as exactly the shape whose points are shapes; and therefore, if we apply an operation meant for shapes to a point of a universe the resulting point should correspond to the shape that we would have obtained had the operation been applied to that shape. Every universe U i is itself a shape and therefore can itself be observed as a point u i in a shape of shapes, i.e. in a universe that contains it. One can think of a universe shape as shrinking down to a point, and being observed as a point from the "next higher" universe, and this spatial picture is how we visualize the following rules (for any i ∈ ω):
Finally, every point of a universe (i.e. every shape in that universe) is a point of every other universe which contains it: shapes, as points, accumulate. The way to visualize this is that if we can observe a shape, then we can observe that shape as a point of a universe. But every universe which contains this universe (as a point) must also contain exactly the shape that we have just observed-and this is visualized by the following rule:
Propositional resizing for U i
Some shapes, as we have said, are contractible, i.e. equivalent to a point. There is another class of shapes that have contractible path shapes, in the sense that for any two points, if they exist, the shape of paths between them is contractible. Such shapes in UF are called propositions. Propositions are so called because, up to equivalence, they are truth values: as shapes they are either empty ("false") or contractible ("true").
It is then reasonable to think of "propositions" as shapes such that for any two of their points (which may not exist) there is a map that picks out a path that connects these two points. Given the meaning of the formal symbols introduced so far, this description can be made formal in order to define the property that the shape A "is a proposition" as
Shapes that are propositions in this sense can be visualized as being very small. Indeed, if they are non-empty, they will be as "small" as a point. As such, we can imagine that if a shape is a proposition in some universe, then it is also a shape in any other universe-and in particular in the "lowest" universe. As it were, such shapes are small enough to thread themselves up and down the universe hierarchy, so to speak. In particular, propositions can be proven, and held to be true, in any universe, and we can always "pull them down" to the lowest universe. And this is exactly how we visualize the following rule:
Univalence for U i
As we have seen, an equivalence between shapes A and B is to be visualized as a continuous deformation that transforms A to B without puncturing or tearing them. As we have said, an intuitive way of visualizing this notion is by picturing a map f : A → B that establishes a "one-to-one correspondence" up to a path. Building on what we have said so far the shape of equivalences (or equivalence shape) is captured by the following definition:
Now, with these visualizations in mind, we can ask: if two shapes are regarded as points in a universe, then how should we visualize a path between them (i.e. how should we visualize the inhabitants of the shape Path U (A, B) )? These paths can be visualized as "tubes" connecting the "blown up" shapes one to the other. Clearly, paths between shapes-as-points-on-a-universe and equivalences between shapes are closely related. Visually, in terms of the above pictures, the right way to think about this correspondence is as follows:
The blue line indicates a path p from A to B in the universe (i.e. a path from A to B when they are regarded as points of the "shape of shapes" U). This path p can be visualized as inducing a "tube" from A to B shown by the "left-leaning" blue curves on the left. An equivalence f between A and B can on the other hand be visualized as inducing all the "right-leaning" cylinders shown in magenta.
Now, each such p can be deformed into f and vice versa. We visualize these deformations as follows: each blue tube can be uniquely broken down into the magenta cylinders induced by an equivalence; conversely the cylinders of an equivalence can each be be uniquely merged into the tube induced by a path. And these processes are visualized exactly as the fact that the shape A B of equivalences between A and B can be deformed into the shape of paths between them (in U)-which means, precisely, that these two shapes are themselves equivalent. In other words, equivalences are equivalent to paths-which is precisely how we visualize the axiom of univalence (for a given universe U i ):
Univalence-i
Heuristic or justification?
Now, let us turn to the issue of whether the shape heuristic presented above is justificatory, i.e. whether or not it compels acceptance of the rules that it helps us understand. Let me first consider some objections. First, one might object that the basic notions of the shape heuristic ("observation", "shape", "viewpoint" etc.) are not fundamental enough to deserve to be called "pre-formal" (or "intuitive"). There is not much to say to this other than that they feel simple enough to me. As mentioned in the beginning, at some point with genuine meaning explanations, the reader will have to rely on their own cognitive faculties to convince themselves that the notions being discussed are meaningful. To my mind the notions I have relied on certainly appear to me to be simple enough, or at the very least no less simple that the analogous notions of "stages", "collections" etc. used to justify the axioms of ZFC e.g. by Boolos (1971) .
Second, even if someone grants that the notions in the shape heuristic are intuitive, one might still doubt whether the description of the realm of shapes in Sect. 2 is consistent. In words echoing the Frege-Hilbert correspondence: what assurance do we have that these shapes actually exist? There are two things to say in response. Firstly, the formal mathematical model in simplicial sets provides some guarantee that this notion of shape (and "point" and "path" etc.) is at least consistent when it is formalized in set theory, and that is certainly a good reason to believe in the consistency of the notion. Secondly, shapes as I have understood them have proved themselves to be extremely potent mathematical tools: homotopy theory has been responsible for some major achievements in 20th century mathematics. Their utility in answering mathematical questions beyond their immediate realm of applicability I think also counts in favour of their consistency (or "reality"). 21 Third, one might also object that the basic intuitive notions I have used do not tack on well with the formal notions in the set-theoretic models of HoTT. For example, one might protest that the formal notion of a "fibration" does not match my intuitive notion of "observable from an arbitrary point". To this I can only reiterate my conviction that these intuitive notions really do tack on to the formally specified ones from algebraic topology. After all, I think it is quite clear that the formal notions originating from algebraic topology, and developed within set theory, are guided by very similar intuitions. One can perhaps think of the realm we are describing in the following way. The intension of a shape is a topological space, i.e. a space as usually understood. Its extension, however, is a homotopy type of topological spaces. Namely, the class of topological spaces up to homotopy equivalence.
The most pressing objection, however, is that the shape heuristic relies on a notion of "shape" that diverges too far from human intuition to be reliably visualized. Essentially, this is equivalent to the objection that the notion of a homotopy type is not visualizable by human intuition and must, rather, be approached only through some formalism. I don't think a definitive response to this objection is possible. What I will do, in lieu of a response, is describe the mental process that I go through when visualizing the shapes involved in the shape heuristic (and leave it up to the reader to decide whether or not it works for them).
I will do so by taking the example of "map shapes", as a test case. A "map shape", recall, is a shape whose points are to be understood as maps between shapes. An apparent difficulty is that when we think of two shapes as consisting of points and paths between points, and of a map between shapes as connecting points in one shape to points on the other, then the mind cannot easily visualize such a map as itself a point (on the "map shape"). I believe these worries can be addressed by thinking in terms of an "induction from the degenerate case". In the degenerate case, a map shape consists of all maps from a contractible shape 1 to a shape A, i.e. we can write the map shape as 1 → A, and think of it as the shape whose points are the "point-shaped points" of A, which is simply a funny way of saying that 1 → A is the shape whose points are the points of A. Thus, the points of this map shape can be thought of precisely as the points of the shape A, and the map shape can be visualized as the shape containing all points of A observable from a single point, i.e. all points of A. Now if instead of 1 we have a shape B, the same reasoning applies: the map shape consists of all maps from B to A, which can be visualized as the shape of all "B-shaped points" of A which is visualizable (I maintain) if we accept that the case where B ≡ 1 is visualizable. Finally, the most general situation consists of having a map from a fixed shape A to shapes B(x) for any point x of A. Such a map can once again be visualized as an "A-shaped point"; except now this " A-shaped point" is spread across multiple different shapes, instead of on one single shape. And thus the map shape Map x:A B(x) can be visualized as the shape of all fragmented "A-shaped" points spread over all the B(x). The "inductive" move is thus in taking for granted that a "A-shaped point" on a single (unfragmented) shape B is visualizable (which itself inductively depends on the degenerate case where A is a contractible shape), and then moving from that to the conclusion that a "fragmented A-shaped point" is visualizable as an "A-shaped point" spread over several shapes (observable from A). For me, visualizing "map shapes" thus, allows me to be confident in the visualization of their rules -and that is as far as I will go.
Similar "inductions" apply to other shape constructors (W -types being, for me, a notable exception, which is why they were not included in the formal system in this paper). In general, this way of moving from evocative images to justification is analogous to the "dimensional reduction" heuristics involved e.g. when dealing with high-dimensional (n > 3) spaces in traditional geometry or state spaces in physics, where we justify (pre-formally) that a form of argument works in higher dimensions by visualizing it in terms of a (usually 1-dimensional) curve moving in 2-dimensional space. The difference is that a shape for us is "high-dimensional" in the sense of its homotopy level, i.e. in the sense of having potentially multiple non-trivial paths between paths, etc., rather than in the sense of spatial dimensions.
Clearly, one has to concede that any defense of the "intuitiveness" or "visualizability" of a spatial notion given in print will enjoy only limited success. What I would say overall is that I believe that the attempt in this paper fares no worse than Boolos' attempt to justify the iterative conception of set in Boolos (1971) . Whether at the end of the day one wants to call what Boolos achieves a mere "heuristic" or a full-blown "justification" is perhaps a matter that cannot be settled, but I think that it is fair to say that what I have done in this paper should be judged on equal footing.
That said, I think it is undeniable that there are certain images that the above description of shapes evokes that one can grasp without knowledge of set-theoretic algebraic topology. Thus, if the notion of shape that I have used in this paper is to be regarded as truly pre-formal, then this paper may be seen as a realization of the suggestion made by Ladyman and Presnell (2015) to justify HoTT by providing "an account of spaces that contains the features needed to support [the rules of HoTT], but which is grounded in pre-mathematical intuitions rather than homotopy theory." meaning explanation have I employed talk of elements, collections etc.-namely, at no point have I appealed to some intuitive theory of sets. It is thus the first step towards making a convincing case that UF can be a self-standing foundation of mathematics that could plausibly serve as a benchmark of rigour on its very own. Now, it is worth pointing out that there may yet be entirely different approaches to providing pre-formal meaning explanations to formalizations of the Univalent Foundations. On the one hand, we could imagine maybe a non-spatial pre-formal meaning explanation for HoTT. For example, an alternative approach to the justification of the identity types in HoTT-where types are regarded as "concepts"-is taken by Ladyman and Presnell (2015) . Similarly, the ongoing development of Computational Higher Type Theory could lead to a meaning explanation for a HoTT based on "higherdimensional computations", although such explanations are for the time being confined to the mathematical realm (as the developers of CHTT concede). 22 Another idea would be simply to replace the spatial notions I have used in this paper with their "groupoidal" counterparts: for example, to replace "shape" by "structure", "path" by "isomorphism" etc. 23 To conclude: in this paper I have provided a spatial meaning explanation for HoTT. If this spatial meaning explanation can be extended to a HoTT that is strong enough to encode all of mathematics as it is currently being practiced, then from this will emerge a picture of the foundations of mathematics in which geometry assumes primacy over other mathematical notions. This signifies a fascinating reversal of the historical trend that led to ZFC, in which mistrust of geometric intuition acted as a primary motivating force. More broadly, this should lead to a reconsideration of the role of geometric thinking not only in mathematics and its foundations, but also perhaps in philosophy and (mathematical) physics. 24 Exploring the limitations and implications of this new picture presents an urgent task. 
